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Curtailing the use of multiple Notices of Intention to Appoint Administrators: The case for a 
moratorium? 
 
Over the past decade there have been a number of proposals for reform of the corporate insolvency 
framework, with the expansion of pre-insolvency moratoria repeatedly on the agenda. Following 
Government consultations on the introduction of a separate moratorium process in 2009, 2010 and 
most recently 2016, the reception of variations on this common theme has been underwhelming. 
Many respondents have questioned the need and benefit of such reform, preferring instead revision 
of the existing structures or even maintaining the status quo. 
The recent decision handed down by the Court of Appeal in JCAM Commercial Real Estate Property 
XV Ltd v Davis Haulage Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 267 on the misuse of repeated Notices of Intention to 
Appoint Administrators may, however, change this perception and reopen the debate over the need 
for a new pre-insolvency moratorium as a gateway mechanism.  
 
The Case 
Davis Haulage Limited (“DHL”) was a company that found itself in financial difficulty in early 2016. In 
the face of possession proceedings from its landlord (the appellant) and the threat of a winding up 
petition from HMRC, DHL’s sole director filed a Notice of Intention to Appoint Administrators (“NoI”) 
with the court on 22 January 2016, thereby creating an interim moratorium of up to ten business 
days pursuant to paragraphs 28 and 44 Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 (all subsequent references 
to paragraphs shall be to Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 unless stated). Three further NoIs were 
filed, immediately following the expiry of each prior NoI, in effect creating a pre-insolvency 
moratorium which ran from 22 January 2016 to 17 March 2016, a period of some 56 days. 
The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether a director must have a settled intention to 
appoint an administrator when filing a NoI. It had been held at first instance that this was not 
necessary, but rather the appointment of an administrator could be considered a second best choice 
should other options under contemplation not work out. 
 
Filing of the NoIs 
DHL’s sole director was entitled to appoint administrators in accordance with paragraph 22, subject 
to giving notice of the intention to the person entitled to appoint an administrator pursuant to 
paragraph 14. Accordingly, a NoI in the prescribed Form 2.8B was filed pursuant to paragraph 26 and 
Rule 2.20 Insolvency Rules 1986. Attached to the NoI was a record of the director’s decision to 
appoint administrators, as required by the prescribed form. This decision recorded that the sole 
director had considered and discussed DHL’s financial position and was of the opinion that DHL was 
insolvent and that he “should seek the immediate appointment of administrators to [DHL] as soon as 
reasonably practicable.” The record went on to state that the director would complete and sign such 
other documentation required “in order to effect the director’s appointment of the 
administrator[s].” 
Despite the contents of the first NoI, correspondence sent by the proposed administrators’ firm 
suggested that the appointment of administrators was not imminent. An email to the appellant’s 
agent dated 2 February 2016 stated that “a feasible solution to secure the business going forward” 
was being sought and that it was intended to “undertake a marketing exercise this week with a 
possibility of completing a sale of the business and assets of [DHL] as a going concern” – this just two 
business days before the interim moratorium was to expire. This was followed by an email enclosing 
the second NoI, stating that the proposed administrators’ firm was working with the management 
team and secured lender of DHL to ensure the “business future survival”, one element of the 
proposal being to settle the arrears to the appellant in full – suggesting that administration would 
not have been the intended outcome. The work to secure the “business future survival” was 
reiterated when the third NoI was sent to the appellant. 
It became apparent that the NoIs were being filed to offer DHL the protection of the interim 
moratorium under paragraph 44 whilst the best means for securing its future were considered, 
rather than as a precursor to the imminent appointment of administrators as indicated in the 
director’s original statement. On 23 February 2016, the appellants’ solicitors were informed that a 
CVA proposal was being prepared, and subsequently on 29 February 2019 that it would be finalised 
the following day. The CVA proposal was then filed at court on 3 March 2016 and sent to creditors 
under cover of a letter dated 4 March 2016, with a meeting scheduled for 23 March 2016.  
Having filed the CVA proposal on 3 March 2016, a fourth NoI was then issued on 4 March 2016. A 
different firm of insolvency practitioners now appeared to be advising the sole director of DHL. The 
sole director explained these actions in a witness statement, stating that following issue of the 
proposal significant creditors intimated they would not support the CVA. The sole director therefore 
considered it “appropriate and necessary for DHL to have the benefit of a moratorium” with the 
“intention to place DHL into administration should the CVA proposal not be approved.” The disparity 
between the director’s witness statement and the series of events appears to have been overlooked 
by the court. The fourth NoI, and the associated interim moratorium, subsequently expired and the 
CVA was approved with modifications on 6 April 2016. 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal 
The appellant was seeking an order that the fourth NoI be vacated and removed from the court file 
on the grounds that it was an abuse of process. In turn, the appellant sought retrospective 
permission for commencement of possession proceedings, which it had originally attempted to 
initiate on 18 January 2016, before being informed of the interim moratorium following the first NoI.  
It was held that the fourth NoI would be so removed, as notice had been invalidly given. Giving the 
lead judgment, David Richards LJ stated that the statute required a settled intention to appoint 
administrators, and in the absence of such intention, notice could not be validly given under 
paragraph 26 nor filed under paragraph 27. As a result, the interim moratorium under paragraph 44 
was not validly invoked. David Richards LJ declined to declare the filing of repeated NoIs as an abuse 
of process. 
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal considered three key characteristics of the interim 
moratorium pursuant to paragraph 44, which were deemed inconsistent with the use on the facts.  
- Firstly, the purpose of the interim moratorium is both limited and specific, offering the 
company protection whilst the person with a prior right of appointment decides whether to 
exercise it. If there is no person with a prior right of appointment, then the interim 
moratorium cannot be invoked; 
 
- Secondly, if the person to whom notice is given exercises its right of appointment, it would 
frustrate the proposed CVA being considered; and 
 
- Thirdly, the presence of a specific pre-CVA moratorium under Schedule A1 and extensive 
consultations about extending this, suggest that the current legislative policy is to restrict a 
pre-CVA moratorium to companies eligible under Schedule A1, not to include all companies 
that have granted floating charges. 
 
Impact on practice 
Whilst David Richards LJ refused to frame the actions of the sole director and his advisers as an 
abuse of process, he did acknowledge that filing a NoI where there was not a settled intention to 
appoint administrators “is no doubt, in a technical sense, an abuse of the court’s process.”  
In the earlier first instance case Re Cornercare Limited [2010] EWHC 893 (Ch), to which David 
Richards LJ does not appear to have been referred, Purle QC HHJ suggested (at para 11) that should 
“an unscrupulous individual or group of individuals” engineer a “continuing moratorium by filing 
repeated notices of intention to appoint … the court would have adequate power to treat that as an 
abuse and act accordingly.” It was considered that these powers would include removing from the 
court file any abusive NoI. 
The judgment handed down by David Richards LJ extends and clarifies this point. There is no 
requirement that a NoI be used unscrupulously for it to be removed from the court file. The 
judgment clearly states that “there is no reason to suppose that either [the sole director] or the 
experienced insolvency practitioners and solicitors advising him and the company did not believe 
that he was entitled to give and file the notices.” Rather, a NoI would be invalid if not used for the 
proper purpose; that is there was not a settled intention to appoint administrators when filing the 
NoI.  
It became apparent during both the first instance and appeal hearings that the filing of repeated 
NoIs to create a continuing moratorium was not uncommon in practice, despite the 2010 judgment 
of Purle QC HHJ. An email from a partner of the solicitors representing DHL in the first instance 
hearing, described as being of considerable experience in the area, stated that it was “not 
uncommon in situations like this where the success of a CVA is uncertain to run a parallel process 
and seek protection in that period.” David Richards LJ appears to acknowledge that such actions 
were accepted practice, however, his concluding remarks make it clear that this practice would not 
be possible in the future: 
“For the future, it will be clear, by reason of this court’s decision, that a conditional proposal 
to appoint an administrator does not entitle or oblige a company or its directors to file a 
notice under paragraph 26 schedule B1.”  
The use of the interim moratorium arising pursuant to paragraph 44 to provide a company with 
breathing space to consider its options or continue trading will no longer be possible. Rather, the 
company or directors must have a settled intention to appoint administrators when giving and filing 
a NoI. Such notice will be invalid if not. How this will be evidenced, or challenged, remains to be 
seen. Perhaps guidance for insolvency practitioners could be included as part of the JIC’s current 
consultation on revising the Insolvency Code of Ethics. 
 
A need for a revised moratorium? 
It is apparent that the sole director and advisers felt that DHL needed the protection of a 
moratorium on creditor actions in order to evaluate and pursue the best option to allow the 
business to continue, and in turn provide the best return for creditors. This is evident in the email 
correspondence from the proposed administrators’ firm, which states that the first NoI was filed in 
view of imminent possession proceedings by the appellant and a possible winding up petition from 
HMRC. 
According to the sole director’s witness statement, trading in administration (and the protection of 
the moratorium under paragraphs 42 and 43) would not have been possible. Any administrator 
would not hold the necessary haulage licences. From records filed at Companies House, DHL was a 
medium-sized company so was not eligible for the protection of the Schedule A1 moratorium 
(though the uptake of this by eligible companies appears to be negligible, see for example Walters 
and Frisby Preliminary Report to the UK Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company Voluntary 
Arrangements (2011)). On the facts, there was no suitable protection available to DHL to allow it to 
pursue the best possible return for creditors safe from adverse individual creditor action. It could be 
argued that this puts the onus on the company and its management to address issues at the earliest 
opportunity, however some events are difficult to plan for. 
In this instance, following the improper moratorium period, a CVA was agreed with DHL’s creditors 
on 6 April 2016. This was less than eleven weeks after the first NoI was filed and three weeks after 
the last NoI expired. Although the CVA subsequently failed, and a pre-packaged sale of the business 
and assets completed, it appears from the administrators’ report filed at Companies House that 
significant payments were made into the CVA during 8 months of continued trading, before the loss 
of two key contracts appears to have undermined further trading. It is questionable whether a CVA 
could have been achieved, in light of the reported creditor pressure, without such respite in the 
preceding weeks. 
Whilst more research is needed into what constitutes a successful CVA outcome (the University of 
Wolverhampton has recently been commissioned by R3, with the support of the ICAEW, to carry out 
such research), allowing a company the chance to instigate a CVA subject to approval by creditors 
must be considered preferable to a rushed pre-packaged administration, or worse still a premature 
winding up of a company’s business. The protection from creditor pressure during the evaluation 
period could be key.  
Whether this be achieved by the extension of the small company CVA moratorium to all companies, 
with some major revisions to address concerns over some of the detailed provisions of Schedule A1, 
or the introduction of a separate flexible gateway mechanism is debateable. This author has 
previously argued in favour of utilising existing mechanisms rather than introducing more layers to 
an already complex system (see (2016) 385 Co.L.N. 1). 
 
The risk of abuse 
The introduction of an effective moratorium in some form for all companies appears a sensible 
development, especially in light of the restriction placed on the future use of NoIs by the judgment 
in JCAM Commercial Real Estate Property XV Ltd v Davis Haulage Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 267. It will be 
important to set clearly the parameters of any moratorium process to avoid claims of improper use. 
One of the overwhelming messages in the responses to the moratorium proposals in the 2016 
consultation, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A consultation on options for reform 
(available at www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-insolvency-
framework), was the risk of abuse of the process (see (2016) 388 Co.L.N. 1 for a summary of the 
responses). Such abuse under the present NoI system has been reported in a number of cases. In X-
Fab Semi-Conductor Foundries AG v Plessey [2014] EWHC 3190 (QB), it appeared a NoI was filed to 
allow the company to complete orders, and maximise debtor payments, safe from enforcement of a 
possession order by the owners of rented factory equipment central to the ongoing production. 
Similarly, in South Coast Construction Ltd v Iverson Road Ltd [2017] EWHC 61 (TCC), three successive 
NoIs were filed seemingly to frustrate an application for summary judgment enforcing the decision 
of an adjudicator pursuant to a building contract, with the company entering liquidation 
immediately following expiry of the third NoI. In each case it was held that the moratorium would be 
(or would have been in the latter case) lifted to allow the claimant’s case to be heard. 
In light of the judgment of David Richards LJ, and the issues of improper use of NoIs raised in the 
abovementioned cases, if a new moratorium is to be introduced, it is crucial that careful thought is 
given to the framing of its purpose. Both users (companies and their management) and facilitators 
(insolvency practitioners) will need clear guidance on where the goalposts stand in order to avoid 
uncertainty and the risk of the moratorium being overturned. Alongside the statutory framing of 
such a process, again it may be something that a revised Insolvency Code of Ethics seeks to address. 
 
Conclusion 
The decision in JCAM Commercial Real Estate Property XV Ltd v Davis Haulage Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 
267 clarifies that, in order to file a NoI, the company or directors must have a settled intention to 
appoint an administrator, and nothing less. That is not of course to say that successive NoIs are 
forbidden. However, what appears to have been a common practice of filing successive NoIs to 
create a prolonged pre-insolvency moratorium to allow a financially distressed company space to 
evaluate its options will no longer be possible. 
Arguably an alternative form of protection is needed. This would protect both those companies that 
would otherwise have used successive NoIs as described above, but perhaps also those companies 
who would not have done so, having interpreted Schedule B1 in the same manner as David Richards 
LJ, but for whom a stay on creditor actions would be beneficial. 
Questions remain as to what is the most appropriate mechanism for this. What is clear, though, is 
that the purpose and parameters for use of any pre-insolvency moratorium need to be clearly 
established. This will avoid uncertainty which could undermine the use of such a process and risk 
further misuse. 
 
 
